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stickfigure 1 days ago [-]
The whole concept of Google Tag Manager was that you could give marketing departments the ability to add "tags" to the website without having to involve engineering. That's how we got 10MB of javascript with every news article.
I hope folks are re-evaluating that now.
CM30 18 hours ago [-]
Client side A/B testing through services like Optimizely and VWO and Adobe Target is a massive security nightmare in of itself. You're giving anyone with access to a third party service the ability to run any code they like on your website, and change any and all interface elements as they see fit.
Even one of these accounts being compromised would be a massive security incident that would potentially put millions of people's data at risk.
MontgomeryPy 17 hours ago [-]
Just pointing out that these testing solutions can also be deployed server-side instead of via client-side tags. I suspect that is the route a lot of their customers will take now.
mankins 16 hours ago [-]
And even at the edge via things like edge side includes or their modern worker versions.
bertmuir 7 hours ago [-]
Ehh. This has been going on for decades, I don't see engineers changing such time-honoured traditions.
In my experience the vulnerabilities are coming from tools brought in by less technical teams, which then get misused by engineers.
These tools are oddly "safe" in the hands of Marketing and the like, because nobody trusts Marketing, so they stick a bunch of guardrails in place to stop anything stupid from doing serious damage.
The same tools are dangerous in the hands of engineers - many engineers trust themselves to do risky things, and will bludgeon you with debate if you tell them they have to follow the same rules as those _simpletons_ in Marketing.
They're usually client-side because engineers don't want to waste time implementing things for Marketing (or more accurately, struggle to support a domain that is radically multidisciplinary and just-in-time and revolves around conforming to non-engineering industry norms, to such a degree that everyone prefers siloing themselves), and the safe space given to Marketing is usually a client-side tag manager so that's where they do it when they have to do it themselves, and then once the tool is implemented client-side, engineers piggybacking off it aren't going to bother with doing a new server-side implementation.
Cue engineers loading Optimizely in their secure product areas, getting exceptions added to CSPs, and the like. Then a major incident. Then a post-mortem highlighting the risks of letting Marketing manage SaaS, then a project to make a secure in-house experimentation solution which the engineers will abandon shortly afterwards... and then finally, a couple years later, someone will discover Marketing has procured Optimizely 2.0 and the cycle repeats.
13 hours ago [-]
goalieca 1 days ago [-]
It also makes adding csp a nightmare. Your marketing department is putting in 30 trackers, changing monthly. And then there’s different countries for end clients with different TLDs for connect-src. You can’t possibly get anything locked down enough. That’s bad for security when you rely on csp for mitigating other factors.
viraptor 22 hours ago [-]
> And then there’s different countries for end clients with different TLDs for connect-src.
Oh how I hate that one. I wish Facebook, Instagram, Google and others would figure out serving the public scripts from .com only.
bornfreddy 13 hours ago [-]
I'm sure they know how to serve from a single domain - but it is in their interest if you are forced to give them the nonce pass. So yeah, it's (again) all about incentives.
viraptor 11 hours ago [-]
I don't think that's the case. Csp doesn't restrict them from doing what they want with tracking tech.
ranger_danger 1 days ago [-]
relying on any client-side "security" is probably a bad idea
johncolanduoni 1 days ago [-]
CSP is there to protect your user’s browser, not your servers. It’s ultimately their credentials that are going to get compromised with an XSS attack.
stingraycharles 1 days ago [-]
All things considered I think CSP is a good thing, a bit of a nuance for website operators, but it probably helps protect against lot of attack types.
dclowd9901 15 hours ago [-]
Client side security isn't the issue, but CSP is kind of a shit show. The configuration apparatus is godawful. I think the best way to think of it is if someone turned CSS (yes, the styling language) into a security configuration protocol. It uses the same style of cascading overrides that CSS employs.
weird-eye-issue 23 hours ago [-]
What is the alternative when you need to embed third-party JavaScript on your pages? Other than just "not doing that"?
notpushkin 20 hours ago [-]
Vet everything, cut down to 2-3 services tops. Selfhost analytics whenever possible. Point to the OP article when asked why we can’t blindly put 30 tags using GTM.
cowlevel 20 hours ago [-]
Response to your pointing out: "so what?"
stickfigure 14 hours ago [-]
> Response to your pointing out: "so what?"
Then you've done your job and move on. Just make sure that there's enough public record of your warning that - when the next cdn supply chain attack happens - you can say "I warned you about this and you decided not to take action".
No organization is perfect. I don't think this is something to quit over. Just make sure to CYA.
embedding-shape 19 hours ago [-]
Response: "Here's my two weeks notice for leaving, let me know if you want to start caring about users again".
Life's too short to work for people who don't care about others.
MassiveQuasar 18 hours ago [-]
You go ahead and find me another job then.
Life’s too short to care about random strangers on the internet sometimes.
embedding-shape 18 hours ago [-]
[flagged]
cowlevel 18 hours ago [-]
Their response: "ok"
and things continue being insecure
stickfigure 14 hours ago [-]
If it's available, pull the third party JS in at build time via package manager rather than at runtime via a CDN you don't control.
NPM isn't perfect but there's typically a substantial delay between the release of a malicious package and that code getting onto your production environment. Unless you're automatically updating every day, there's a good chance someone will discover the problem before it affects you. And you can always scan your upstream dependencies.
This doesn't work if you're using someone else's CDN. Any change to their content is distributed to all your users immediately.
easyThrowaway 18 hours ago [-]
A certificate-based approach for scripts residing on different domains, for example, so you can be sure it hasn't been tampered with.
A javascript file served from example-a.com should be able to run on example-b.org only if it has been signed with the same TLS key used for example-a.com .
dclowd9901 15 hours ago [-]
CSP allows you to configure your loaded JS with a complementary hash check. If you're the one who puts the script on your page, in theory, it should be safe for as long as remains the same.
ItsABytecode 16 hours ago [-]
Isn't this already true if the script is served over HTTPS?
weird-eye-issue 15 hours ago [-]
How would that actually look in reality?
RobotToaster 19 hours ago [-]
Other than tracking, what situations are there where "not doing that" is not an option?
jeltz 18 hours ago [-]
Not doing that. It is just not a secure thing to do.
dbetteridge 22 hours ago [-]
Proxy through your own domain? Has its own issues though
weird-eye-issue 21 hours ago [-]
That is not any more secure if you are just blindly proxying the third party scripts and in fact is worse since it runs in the context of your own domain.
cowlevel 20 hours ago [-]
Since the third party tag can request anything, this doesn't stop anything and now your domain has an open redirect.
adrr 1 days ago [-]
Most of it is server to server now with server side tagging. 3rd party cookies are now 1st party and beacon call is server to server.
robomc 1 days ago [-]
I mean, really that situation is CSP finally earning its keep. Put whatever you want in tag manager but at the end of the day it's not going to work unless I review it.
captn3m0 14 hours ago [-]
Google’s suggested workaround for CSP enabled sites for GTM is to use a nonce, which GTM then propagates to all further scripts that it injects.
Nonce would kill this idea, but fortunately it is the webadmin that needs to install it.
In the end this is a tradeoff between security and convenience.
pksebben 4 hours ago [-]
Perhaps I’m not really following, but it seems like in this case they were executing blind anyhow? If they implemented a nonce where would they have derived the trust for it? If they’re just running what they’re given this attack came from the trusted vector so i would assume a nonce wouldn’t add much other than rubber stamping what was already corrupted…
goalieca 9 hours ago [-]
I think that works for script-src but not connect-src.
jeswin 24 hours ago [-]
> I hope folks are re-evaluating that now.
Not going to happen. Most decisions in tech do not factor in risk, only cost. Risk mitigation usually requires considerable spend, and very few people/companies are willing to spend on low-probability events.
simonra 12 hours ago [-]
Risk is always reducible to cost though. Even for human life, the cost of safety equipment is weighted against the statistical value/cost of a life, instead of spend on for instance maritime equipment being engineered to be infinite. One could argue that the cost is harder to define for squishier subjects, for instance like the privacy of pictures from my vacation or that I send to my physician. But I’d argue that is even simpler, the value is just what one is willing to spend to not risk it, plus any cost of cleanup/being made whole.
dclowd9901 15 hours ago [-]
I know you're sort of speaking abstractly, and I think you're correct that this is how companies interpret risk, but it's interesting to give a moment's thought to -- Murphy's Law tells us all events have a 100% probability of occurring given a certain amount of time. And we tend to see that proven out time and again.
antonvs 14 hours ago [-]
This might change as AI-assisted hacks and outages become more frequent. A materialized risk with associated costs is very different from an abstract risk that's hard to quantify.
kursus 16 hours ago [-]
There were a couple of years before the concept of tag manager where publishers would just blindly call a JS file on their trafficker's server. This file was maintained by engineering, and you would still end up with MB of junk on every page (especially since this was before any kind of tracking regulation, wild things would happen behind the scenes). So this is more on the advertising industry itself than on wannabe devs PMs.
vibebingo 1 days ago [-]
We also get wasted Engineering time tracking down bugs caused by crap being added.
michaelbuckbee 15 hours ago [-]
Beyond all the issues with third party JavaScript inclusion on sites blowing up their security perimeter, there are also significant issues with the link tracking for these as they nest and re-encode their values so much in the URLs any reasonable firewall concludes that they're some kind of obfuscation attack.
uptrails 12 hours ago [-]
Malware ads are common even when nothing is compromised. They even happened on YouTube. I doubt anyone is reevaluating this because a lot of money is riding on getting paid to run sketchy third-party JS to monetize everything.
We get sanctimonious about this, but geeks build all that monetization infrastructure, not people from marketing.
hinkley 12 hours ago [-]
I get beat up for six months about TTFB and then in the 11th hour, management adds half a second to FMP like none of the conversations from the last six month have mattered in the slightest. Every goddamned time.
Muromec 18 hours ago [-]
We are indeed re-evaluating it now
wang_li 1 days ago [-]
What is that saying? A person will not understand something that their paycheck requires them to not understand.
That’s why it needs to become criminal for a website to serve malware, including through third party channels like ad networks and analytics services. Serving shit websites is no different than knowingly, or negligently, dumping toxic waste and should be treated the same.
gruez 1 days ago [-]
If it's criminal for sites to accidentally serve malware, what does it mean for open source projects to accidentally get hit by supply chain attacks, or for them to get compromised by a rogue contributor (eg. xz)?
friendzis 24 hours ago [-]
Those website operators include third-party code willingly and explicitly. There was never an accident. There is no supply-chain attack here: you cannot seriously claim that unaudited, unauthenticated terminal with root security principal getting used is an attack.
If your website is making any requests outside of the original domain, there's no "accidental" in anything the website does.
w4der 22 hours ago [-]
Someone _could_ argue that a vibecoded website is doing "accidental" things (like serving malware).
jeltz 18 hours ago [-]
Someone could argue that the sky is green.
Filligree 18 hours ago [-]
Malware is malware. People shouldn’t be offering software that they can’t stand behind.
I see no way to distinguish between huge megacorps and individuals.
wang_li 1 days ago [-]
A business in the US has legal liability if they fail to do their due diligence in their supply chain and it turns out their suppliers are involved in human trafficking, child labor, forced labor, etc. or is using hazardous materials in the product.
There should be standards that people have to live up to if they are going to provide a product, even for free, to others.
lazyasciiart 1 days ago [-]
Do they? Without signing up?
zelphirkalt 24 hours ago [-]
Any cases of that being enforced with any significant business ever? What about aiding genocide? (FB, and weapon makers for example)
bloppe 1 days ago [-]
One could distinguish between criminal negligence and forgivable negligence in court. Unfortunately for GP that probably means you can't actually stick charges on anybody who serves malware via an ad network like this.
ceejayoz 1 days ago [-]
> One could distinguish between criminal negligence and forgivable negligence in court.
Open source is already expensive from a time standpoint, you wanna make it expensive from a monetary standpoint too?
jeltz 18 hours ago [-]
Yes. Why should you be allowed to be negligent just because your product is open source?
ceejayoz 15 hours ago [-]
The question is more "why should it cost $50k in legal fees to prove I wasn't negligent in my unpaid hobby".
bloppe 13 hours ago [-]
in theory at least, frivolous lawsuits should be compensated for
ceejayoz 12 hours ago [-]
In the US, that's quite rare.
j16sdiz 1 days ago [-]
Software is already hard from functionality standpoint, you wanna make it hard from security standpoint too?
zelphirkalt 24 hours ago [-]
It is already hard from a security standpoint, only that we ignore security.
zelphirkalt 24 hours ago [-]
Easy solution: Don't use ad networks. That'll likely free your site from illegal tracking, as well as ad trash, and will even improve your lIgHtHoUsE score!
cowlevel 1 days ago [-]
Yes. It means the legitimate maintainer of xz would be in prison right now.
hedora 1 days ago [-]
Liability should aggregate up to the largest platform involved. Optimizely in this case, I guess. Google for Google Tags.
We should also enforce antitrust laws.
DaiPlusPlus 1 days ago [-]
> A person will not understand something that their paycheck requires them to not understand.
I never really understood this idiom, because how can a PHB engineering manager (for example) be required to not understand their team's technology in order to retain their job? Surely if that manager knows their team's work inside out then they would be a more effective manager - which is good for everyone?
If I squint-my-brain, I can see how (for example) that anyone who works full-time as an SEO "consultant" in the year 2026 would only be if they actually believed that SEO tricks actually worked, which requires them to not understand how modern search-engines' spiders actually work (because it's my belief that "SEO" has been either nonsense bollocks - or a complete grift - since the mid-2010s). Am I close?
jeltz 18 hours ago [-]
Because it is not the PHB that starts the problem. It is someone from some other department (usually marketing) who wants tracking, wants it now and wants it done with GTM and will whine to th C-levels until the engineers add Google Tag Manager.
LorenPechtel 1 days ago [-]
It's not the team's technology that's being referred to. It's about hazards. People whose job it is to do X have a hard time understanding that X shouldn't be done.
In this case, it's the dangers of the tracking and advertising frameworks being used for hostile purposes.
mschuster91 16 hours ago [-]
> because it's my belief that "SEO" has been either nonsense bollocks - or a complete grift - since the mid-2010s
It's a continuous case of whack-a-mole. SEO consultants think <thing> would be a good way to improve the search ranking of their customers, it works, it spreads throughout the industry, Google catches on, rinse and repeat.
As soon as something is a KPI, there is incentive to game the system - with the top end of "gaming the system" toeing or crossing the line into fraudulent, anti-competitive or otherwise illegal territory.
nemomarx 1 days ago [-]
If you're only still there because your boss believes SEO works, you better keep acting like your SEO tricks work.
necovek 1 days ago [-]
It's not about actual understanding, but about pretending not to understand — because if one does, they might be out of a job. ;)
blacksqr 1 days ago [-]
"It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it."
--Upton Sinclair
Twirrim 13 hours ago [-]
"There are none so blind as those who will not see" - John Heywood (et al.)
The follow on line from that one is even better: "The most deluded people are those who choose to ignore what they already know". I would probably want to add on things like "because it's not convenient" or similar for particular relevance to some of the stuff I've been dealing with recently at work. Folks know it's dangerous to do something a certain way, and know how to do it a safe way, but it's not as convenient so they delude themselves it'll be fine just this once. And just this once too. And just this once, once more. Slowly but surely normalising the deviance.
In the context of the Optimizely case, people know they're giving it dangerous levels of capabilities, but it's just too darn inconvenient to do it in a safe way so sure, why not. It'll be fine (and it will be, right up until it isn't and you realise your choice has compromised your users)
JumpCrisscross 1 days ago [-]
> it needs to become criminal
I know we really like mass incarceration in America. But maybe start with civil liability and a private right to enforcement?
cowlevel 20 hours ago [-]
Even just the process of going to court usually scares people straight even if they don't end up with any liabilities or costs.
ksajadi 1 days ago [-]
this. amen
egorfine 21 hours ago [-]
GTM is incredible, really.
I'm programming for over 30 years now and GTM is my personal #1 most hated software.
bornfreddy 13 hours ago [-]
Really? Worse than IE6? I'd say it's a close call, but IE6 "wins".
egorfine 13 hours ago [-]
Well, GTM is my #1 in living software. MSIE6 is dead. But yeah if this filter is being removed then MSIE6 takes the cake obviously.
zipy124 21 hours ago [-]
The funniest part is adding GTM generally means you score low on google's pagespeed metrics through lighthouse
davidmurdoch 18 hours ago [-]
Just had marketing try to add all OTHER previous page events to a new event, because they didn't want to to go through the trouble of creating a dashboard using the user funnel to this feature.
They knew they could do it, and how, they just didn't want to spend 10 minutes doing it themselves. To them, asking an engineer to do it in code is easier because it only takes a minute to ask.
pasc1878 15 hours ago [-]
But the engineer doing it is doing it once rather than the marketeer doing it manually every time..
davidmurdoch 13 hours ago [-]
The marketer just needs to hit "Save" once.
mihaaly 22 hours ago [-]
I am sure. Marketing folks are famous about being reasonable and showing restraint, even if their revenues would suffer.
antonvs 14 hours ago [-]
Marketing folks they were the driving force behind Adobe Flash, but the issues with that were so great that the industry did eventually get rid of it. It just takes time for the costs to become sufficiently apparent to everyone.
AI-assisted hacks and outages are accelerating the process of making the costs of weak security apparent.
dickersnoodle 20 hours ago [-]
Good luck with that.
badgersnake 16 hours ago [-]
The “insights” get product managers promoted, so it’s here to stay.
Unless we get rid of product managers, which isn’t a terrible idea.
ihsw 1 days ago [-]
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150g2 24 hours ago [-]
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taurath 1 days ago [-]
The owners of the ad platforms end up dictating what data is used, they have the leverage and also marketing departments with power end up forcing engineering to use the audience tools Google and Meta provide. At least GTM gets blocked by ad-blockers.
We got 10MB of javascript (maybe 10 years ago...) because engineering needs to build one frontend with multi browser and multi screen support so they picked an off-the-shelf do-everything framework like Amber or Angular, or a react/redux build with 300 nested dependencies.
01284a7e 1 days ago [-]
No, the 10MB (sometimes way more) of JavaScript for a damn news article has nothing to do with SPA frameworks (Angular) or libraries like React. It is tracking malware put there by marketing/advertising idiots.
etoxin 1 days ago [-]
I remember when this first became a thing when page size was important. I fought tooth and nail with marketing to try and block tag manager. I've had third party URLs block production apps in Chrome before because some marketing url was hosting malicious code.
The most infuriating thing, when you do remove these tags, marketing forgets they exist and are like "Oh we don't use that anymore".
zelphirkalt 24 hours ago [-]
About the "Oh we don't use that anymore.": That shows you the professionalism of the profession.
Often also true for software development, unfortunately.
bertmuir 6 hours ago [-]
Do you have an alternative to tracking malware that wouldn't involve the majority of profitable tech companies to flipping to lossmaking overnight?
I can imagine the big corporations spending millions on econometrics teams or commissioning mix modelling like the olden days, but it's pretty shit by comparison, and beyond the MNCs there's hundreds of thousands of SMEs without the money/scale and with business models that hinge on digital advertising.
zelphirkalt 24 hours ago [-]
Porqué no los dos? Both are true. Heavy JS frameworks, ads, trackers, etc., but also heavy web fonts, of which maybe 5 icons are used for the site, but the font weighs a megabyte. Just in case you need it.
vasco 1 days ago [-]
Those were decisions at a time engineering was time constrained. All those ancillary things are returning to engineering since its just one more prompt now to manage it.
mcoliver 1 days ago [-]
This stuff is so avoidable but unless we implement meaningful reprocussions things aren't going to change. There is no accountability.
In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
noir_lord 1 days ago [-]
> How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
It doesn't cost them anything but a "whoops" post when they fuck up, so the incentive is misaligned (as you noted under repercussions).
The cost is externalised onto everyone else not them so it's not going to change.
geetee 1 days ago [-]
This is the only answer
skrebbel 21 hours ago [-]
Are you sure? The affected companies are going to totally make Optimizely pay for damages. That could become a lot of money pretty fast. And tbh, I'm not sure that the average ToS's maximum liability ceiling will hold up in court with a blast radius this big.
tgv 20 hours ago [-]
Usually, the plaintiff/claimant has to prove the damages they suffered, not the damages their (non-paying) users suffered. So then they would have to claim reputation damage or something like that, and that might not be so easy to prove.
acdha 18 hours ago [-]
It could happen but if you look at the last few decades of losses from software bugs, it’s exceedingly rare for the cost to be more than lost future business, and even that’s unusual. Remember when CrowdStrike brought down businesses around the world and they suffered … having their share price more than double?
Accountability is incompatible with tech sector as it currently exists. The entire ethos of move fast and break things is incompatible with it never mind the shady adtech part of the sector.
NewLogic 22 hours ago [-]
Accountability is incompatible with maximising next qtr profits. Modern business culture is rotten.
Havoc 18 hours ago [-]
Partially but don’t think that quite follows. A lot of businesses aren’t as fraught with conflicts of interest as tech.
A company making say bricks has an incentive to cut costs too certainly but they’re not implementing loot boxes, tracking people semi covertly, implementing dark patterns to boost engagement by any means or heaven forbid launching missies based on sketchy AI decisions.
preg_match 12 hours ago [-]
Yes but the brick company might knowingly produce lower-quality bricks which can cause a house to crumble at a lower cost. Then they say nothing to anyone, consumers buy the bad bricks thinking they’re the same, and the company makes a ton of profit for a while. For a while, until inevitably people notice. But by then it doesn’t matter, the money was made and those decision makers are long gone. If the CEO had any brains, he’d jump to another company and boast about how much he raised their revenue.
The incentives are fucked across the board. When you look at the CEOs we revere and the ones who have the most leverage and mobility, it’s shocking to see how many absolutely destroyed their company in exchange for a good few quarters. That’s actually seen as good somehow, those decision makers are desirable!
gniv 16 hours ago [-]
> There is no accountability.
When Europe tries they are either laughed at or accused of slowing down innovation.
ec109685 1 days ago [-]
This wasn’t a release. It was their engine that emits the variants being compromised.
friendzis 24 hours ago [-]
> I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
This is the bare minimum. Automatic 3rd party requests should be considered data unsolicited data disclosure under GDPR.
marcus_holmes 1 days ago [-]
None of that is part of commercial web dev culture. Leftpad-level dependencies are.
augment_me 1 days ago [-]
Please tell me in whose incentive it is to change any of this and hold the sites accountable?
Who cares? Next week you forget about this and move on
skybrian 1 days ago [-]
There's a missing step in the explanation. Do major websites like CNN and BBC handle cryptocurrency or credit cards on the same website? Why? Or is there also a browser security bug?
hn_throwaway_99 1 days ago [-]
I had the same question, and I really wish these reports would make in clearer what exactly the malware can and can't do. The whole point of web browsers is that sites run in a sandbox so that even if a site does serve malicious code, it should be limited to just that site.
From what I could tell, the malware just generally looked at anything on the page, in cookies/local storage, or clipboard that looks like a crypto address or credit card number. So for sites like CNN or BBC they shouldn't be able to do much damage unless there is a subscription page for example that takes credit card number.
However, the malware also delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, which do take advantage of browser vulnerabilities in iOS to cause more serious damage.
deanc 1 days ago [-]
The report is appalling. The scale of this is enormous. Saying to update your stuff is not helping detect infection.
Ekaros 24 hours ago [-]
I feel that whole web site model is broken. They are run in "sandbox" same way AI companies run their sandboxes. Not caring at all where they do call... So every other site needs to implement protections against other sites.
The model is broken on fundamental level and it will never be fixed.
jahller 23 hours ago [-]
the toolkit appears to also skim credit cards and there are many e-commerce pages in that list.
dboreham 16 hours ago [-]
I imagine CNN does, but they might have been smart enough to unburden the payment pages from the marketing/surveillance cruft. Or perhaps not. There have also been browser escape vulnerabilities.
ano-ther 13 hours ago [-]
Maybe I overlooked it, but is this something persistent that I should take care of on my phone and computer or was it confined to a browser session?
For anyone unaware, this also works on Firefox on Android, as it has support for almost all extensions.
_ks3e 12 hours ago [-]
Based on a brief skim: not persistent on computers, persistent on phones for certain old iOS versions (18 and below, 26 would only be fingerprinted).
Some ublock lists (e.g. Peter Lowe's server list) block everything from optimizely.com, so if you enabled those you're good.
thought-gap 1 days ago [-]
This is exactly the kind of use case for NoScript - reduce exposure to potentially malicious content.
usr1106 1 days ago [-]
Yes. But many, if not most of the affected sites where 100% serious businesses. On those you often have have to enable JS to make the site usable. Some random ad financed site are different stories, there you might just move on.
thought-gap 1 days ago [-]
> 100% serious businesses. On those you often have have to enable JS to make the site usable.
It's not all or nothing. NoScript [0] lets you run JS (and other specific types of content) from domains and/or sub-domains you allow and reject from those you don't. So you'd allow JS from my-serious-business domain and their CDN, and disallow all else, including those mentioned in the linked article.
It would not have helped here. gitlab.com and my bank are on the list. Obviously I could not have blocked them.
thought-gap 1 days ago [-]
> gitlab.com and my bank are on the list.
Per the linked article, those are not the domains where the malicious JS was served from.
c-fe 20 hours ago [-]
> Some customers serve their snippet from their own domain, such as opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js or www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js. Those were affected too, because the content comes from the same Optimizely project.
in some cases they were
thought-gap 8 hours ago [-]
Yep. That's true in the cases where Optimizely customers had set up a proxy to the Optimizely JS content. I suspect (though I have no way of knowing) that these are exceptional cases and not the norm. In most cases I expect Optimizely customers would use the snippet that loads JS from the Optimizely CDN.
To be more specific
NoScript would have still caught if such proxy was through
* a separate custom domain that was not previously trusted by the user
* a separate sub-domain of a trusted peer domain (like the opt.scheels.com example) and NoScript user opted for sub-domain level blocking
NoScript would not have caught if the proxy was through the first party primary domain (like the www.vodafone.com.au/js example) - i.e. the domain or sub-domain that the user had already trusted.
So, while it's not a full guarantee, it reduces the exposure risk significantly in most common scenarios.
acdha 18 hours ago [-]
The article states the opposite, which I’m almost certain was due to the attacker realizing that Content-Security-Policy was blocking the payload on many sites:
“A full inline copy of the payload, which runs through eval if 1688360.cc is blocked.”
thought-gap 11 hours ago [-]
> The article states the opposite, which I’m almost certain was due to the attacker realizing that Content-Security-Policy was blocking the payload on many sites:
>
> “A full inline copy of the payload, which runs through eval if 1688360.cc is blocked.”
No, the article doesn't state that the JS served by all listed first party websites was compromised (but see note below). The original maliciously modified content was still (in most cases) served from an optimizely domain like cdn.optimizely.com. The cdn.optimizely.com would not have been blocked by web browsers. The "full inline copy of the payload" refers to content served through that optimizely payload, instead of those additional domains the attacker had set up. About a paragraph or so above your quote:
> The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted.
That said, while this is a very common scenario, it doesn't cover all of them. There's still a possibility that certain optimizely customers have set up a reverse proxy for the optimizely JS snippet. If this proxy was through a separate sub-domain it's possible NoScript would have caught it (if user opted for sub-domain level blocking). If this proxy was through one of their own primary domain names that user already trusted in Noscript, it would not catch it. So it's not perfect, but covers most common scenarios.
Taking a step back, I'm not sure why there is so much pushback in this thread. Most of it seems to be based on either no or incorrect reading of the information or incorrect understanding. I'm not in any way associated with NoScript or trying to convince folks to use it. Given the incident, I think it's worth stating that this type of attack falls under its main use cases. A reasonably configured NoScript would have protected users in most of these cases. Whether it makes sense for users to use it or not is up to them - it depends on where you see the line between security and convenience tradeoff.
usr1106 50 minutes ago [-]
> A reasonably configured NoScript would have protected
I don't doubt that. But how many users can achieve a reasonably configured NoScript, without breaking things they want to use? I am a developer, so I should be able to do it or I were a bad one. But I am sick of an immoral industry that requires me to do extra work because they are trying to steal something from me in an ever growing multitude of ways every time I click somewhere and even without.
usr1106 1 days ago [-]
Even if they weren't (I have not studied the details), when using NoScript and something does not work you need to enable additional domains. It is infeasible to find the minimal necessary set, so you'll end up with a long allow list.
neobrain 22 hours ago [-]
Don't know about noscript specifically, but uMatrix has a default block-list that's safe to enable by default and that includes optimizely. So allowing everything except this default block-list would have protected you from this attack already without any inconvenience of managing allow-lists.
fhn 11 hours ago [-]
uMatrix is a fail for me. It kills MS Outlook at work even though everything is green.
manphone 19 hours ago [-]
And an allow list where I’ve made decisions about individual exceptions is a problem why? Do you think having a long list of exceptions is a security problem compared to the entire Internet?
usr1106 14 hours ago [-]
Not talking about a security problem. It's a workload problem for me.
manphone 10 hours ago [-]
Every time I buy a new computer, I reset this from scratch and it usually takes me less than seven days to have to set up about one exception every few days at most so I think it’s pretty low maintenance for the benefit.
fc417fc802 1 days ago [-]
This is simply incorrect. I still use umatrix. On bloated sites there's typically only one or two key domains that need to be permitted. Once you've been running it for a while you can usually guess which ones are needed based on what the grid of resources looks like. Most third party domains aren't required most of the time even for what you described above as "serious businesses". I block most of the third party resources on my bank's website. Honestly the number of dependencies that they pull in absolutely disgusts me; their online banking interface absolutely chugs on low end devices.
magicalhippo 23 hours ago [-]
I ran uMatrix as well for a long time, and in general there were very few sites where you had to enable JS across the board.
Was a pain though on eCommerce sites as they'd often switch payment processors and then you had to do the whole dance of partially successful payments until you found the right set of allow lists.
calgoo 22 hours ago [-]
Agree, it takes about a week to allow like 60% of pages we visit daily. Then over a month the rest of sites that we occasionally visit. Then there are the pages that completely break when we remove the ad js crap, and then you can take a decision on if you want to continue using that site or not. I have also messages a couple of smaller sites that break when you removed googles tracking, because of the order they load JS, and they promptly fixed it.
zelphirkalt 24 hours ago [-]
I often do so regularly, and have built up passive knowledge about what shit to enable and what not. Optimizely is very far in the realms of shit not getting enabled. I have not had a single instance of it being useful for me as a visitor or user of a website. It does not serve me and it's trash.
mewpmewp2 23 hours ago [-]
However many will put optimizely and things like that proxying through their domains.
boomlinde 1 days ago [-]
If by serious businesses you mean ones that view the inclusion of megabytes of unvetted JS as a security risk and a failure of engineering, there are few serious businesses.
usr1106 14 hours ago [-]
I don't disagree. The majority are seriously shitty businesses. Can a name a big bank, hotel reservation, airline, you name it that is significantly different in that respect?
tgv 20 hours ago [-]
I think uMatrix Origin blocks optimizely by default. It's more user friendly than NoScript.
subscribed 9 hours ago [-]
+1
Allows for really easy, selective and contextual permissions for some critical capabilities.
mywittyname 13 hours ago [-]
Yes, but unfortunately I allow-listed optimizely some time ago because some sites wouldn't work without it.
rickreynoldssf 14 hours ago [-]
I've never understood why Optimizely is a thing. Why is A/B testing so hard? I implemented a full A/B test system for a major media website in 1 day about 10 years ago and its still in use today (I can pull the the secret report on any page and I just did). Its just simple induction algorithms, tagging and conditional rendering.
Apparently, one of Optimizely's core features is its WYSIWYG editor. This means it's supposedly useful for running A/B tests without writing any code.
However, I don't know what kind of code is generated by WYSIWYG, and I don't have a good impression of it.
mywittyname 14 hours ago [-]
Marketing teams don't have engineering resources, generally speaking. But they do have the clout to get engineering to install this little tool that will help them "self service."
preg_match 12 hours ago [-]
It’s not even that marketing doesn’t have engineering resources, it’s that they don’t want them. They want to be able to self-service, they don’t want to hear about security, or bundle size, or maintenance risk, or…
It’s the same reason financial analysts build the tower of bable in Excel. Some COULD access engineering resources, but they don’t want to. The fact that there’s no controls, audibility, or quality management is not a “bug”, that’s the primary feature they’re after.
This also describes the risk of giving non-engineers access to runtimes and AI. They can, and will, build monstrosities outside of the purview of management.
ea016 1 days ago [-]
> On iPhone/iPad/iPod only: injects boot.js from two .icu hosts and, on iOS ≤ 18.6, a hidden iframe.
Anyone knows what this might be? Can you jailbreak from safari on those versions?
[edit] From the other link, it seems to be Coruna and DarkSword exploits
themanualstates 3 hours ago [-]
iOS ≤ 26.2 also! As far as I knew persistent, and even able to steal from third party crypto apps.
The official advise is to keep a check on your account history some time before November … lol.
jdorfman 24 hours ago [-]
Subresource Integrity has been available for over a decade. It’s time to start implementing it with these services.
I think it's not used because they are continuously updating their scripts for users.
dclowd9901 15 hours ago [-]
If you are often updating your scripts, you need to offer an SDK so that users can import the code through an SRI checked script. It looks like Optimizely has one available: https://github.com/optimizely/javascript-sdk, so there's no reason not to use SRI with it.
QGQBGdeZREunxLe 13 hours ago [-]
I still don't see how this would prevent this type of attack.
An SDK doesn't necessarily mean that scripts are kept up to date as a site's build could've been done months or years ago with the SDK version pinned in npm.
If I were to setup a system today, I would mirror any script from a third-party and pipe it through a LLM to check for malicious code before deploying.
Groxx 11 hours ago [-]
Yeah, essentially none of these larger sites want to manually approve third-party script changes like this (if they did, they'd have self-hosted the script at a minimum (some do! not many)). They'd have just automated adding any new script SHAs, and then it'd be exactly back where it was before.
mattmatters 1 days ago [-]
Optimizely is a pretty garbage platform so this is unsurprising. Love the work though folks like report uri are doing finding this.
eax-eip 1 days ago [-]
> We don't know how the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a compromised credential with cross-customer access, or something else. That's for Optimizely to explain. To be clear, Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. Optimizely's own sites were affected as well: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com both carried the code.
Interesting that it is not necessarily a supply chain attack a la LiteLLM/some of the other recent breaches. Possibly just a mass compromise of customer passwords.
goofygoober1234 17 hours ago [-]
This is likely a result of Optimizely cutting headcount on their legacy product engineering teams to reallocate funding towards their AI product. We’re going to see more stories like this for every company taking a similar approach.
mcoliver 1 days ago [-]
This stuff is so avoidable but unless we implement meaningful reprocussions things aren't going to change. There is no accountability.
In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
Both were part of the research and were audited as recently as October 2026 with evidence recorded that they werre deploying Optimizely without consent (a legal obligation in the EU).
So smoking gun evidence that they were unlawfully deploying Optimizely in the last 6 weeks across the EU leaves them ripe for litigation.
Animats 1 days ago [-]
Why should browsers be allowed to read or write user files without user intervention and serious warnings?
draven 1 days ago [-]
Here the attackers targeted forms, swapping crypto addresses or exfiltrating CC details, they did not read or write user files.
Animats 7 hours ago [-]
Oh, I thought the attack had broken out of the browser. Did it persist after the browser session, or just affect other open windows.
pamcake 1 days ago [-]
Unfortunate with this nonsense slop report for a seemingly significant event like this.
> Your origin can be clean while your visitors are robbed — the compromise sits in the tag layer.
userbinator 1 days ago [-]
Why do LLMs still produce such unusually awkward phrases, despite being trained on human English?
cowlevel 20 hours ago [-]
Model collapse
TeMPOraL 23 hours ago [-]
These phrases are not awkward, it's high-quality human English writing.
The models are using language correctly, but their whole universe is limited to a single session. They're not aware that all the previous sessions also used the same phrase, that you've seen it 10 times in the last hour, etc.
Humans naturally avoid repeating the exact same phrases and jokes they just heard from several other sources, but sometimes you can see the same phenomenon with people too: when there's new bullshit phrase or trend spreading through tiktok/instagram (or popular press), there's a brief moment you can catch many normies regurgitating the exact same phrase "independently".
The front of the meme virality wave sure does look weird.
acdha 18 hours ago [-]
> These phrases are not awkward, it's high-quality human English writing.
It’s not high-quality, though — it’s SEO speak to pad blog posts without adding anything of substance. We notice it more because that stuff is so common in the training data but not the experience of anyone who doesn’t spend time on content mills.
ubercore 22 hours ago [-]
But it's not especially or high quality English either. That phrasing is awkward even in isolation.
yubblegum 15 hours ago [-]
No it is not, imo. It is dense, terse, and complete. It is in fact high quality geek speak.
ubercore 15 hours ago [-]
Agree to disagree! Fair enough.
wswin 13 hours ago [-]
It's not suitable for a technical writing, it's too engaging for what it has to say.
jhhghhjjkuhb 16 hours ago [-]
[flagged]
fc417fc802 1 days ago [-]
Because if you ignore the surrounding context and any broader technical details that are relevant then the phrasing itself in a vacuum isn't awkward at all. In fact I'd say it reads like well polished marketing copy. The trouble is that not only does it not exist in a vacuum but also all of us are sick of what has now become utterly cliche voicing.
cowlevel 20 hours ago [-]
there's no such thing as a "tag layer"
ksenzee 11 hours ago [-]
If you reinterpret "tag" as "snippet of HTML that usually includes a <script> element," and you have an entire service bolted onto your website whose sole purpose is to let marketing people add "tags" to the website, then yeah, you might as well call it a tag layer.
fc417fc802 16 hours ago [-]
That sounds like a technical detail to me.
DaiPlusPlus 1 days ago [-]
If my Origin was "clean" then it wouldn't be loading any scripts from external websites...
slopnt 1 days ago [-]
ahhh yes, the famous tag layer
lukeify 1 days ago [-]
That's layer 8 of the OSI model.
bombcar 1 days ago [-]
It’s right above the egg layer.
wry_xy 1 days ago [-]
Still better than the human slop filter Gizmodo ran it through in their rehashed article. Actual quote:
> On mobile, Report URI says they attempted to install exploit kids.
Is there anything useful served from any *.icu domain? I wonder if I just should block the whole TLD and be done with it.
freecodeio 22 hours ago [-]
I think blocking all but ~6-7 tlds should be pretty safe. I have personally seen so rarely malware or phishing hosted in famous tlds.
ijidak 1 days ago [-]
Risk is when *.icu is guaranteed to be ICU.
Sorry I had to say it ;-)
0x68 23 hours ago [-]
Optimizely is slowly dying ever since they forced new customers into their DXP/Saas solution.
Optimizely, or Episerver as it was previously called, was such a pleasure to work on - but since version 13 they more or less vendor locked you into their own authentication (Opti ID / Entra AD (?)) and their Optimizely Graph for search and content look up. You can keep self-hosting but you won't get access to Opti Id or Graph if you're not on their tenant.
I guess this is the inevitable happen - everyone gets hacked at the same time when hosting on a SaaS platform.
develoopest 22 hours ago [-]
Completely true about their auth, each time I have to use their service, it's incredibly complicated to even login, their policies for password expiration are ridiculous and you are constantly prompted to move your credentials to newer systems without any benefit.
All of that for them to mess their own security.
If it was on me, I would stop using them.
clcaev 13 hours ago [-]
NewsWeek has listed 150+ popular websites across major economy sectors.
> This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect. Our platform can ...
It's otherwise nearly the same information.
It would be kind of ironic if the hijacking warning article got hijacked, I guess?
no-name-here 23 hours ago [-]
1. The former seems to have a tiny fraction as much detail as the latter.
2. The former seems super more clear to me to be AI generated prose.
3. The latter explicitly continue talks about the actions they took, that they reached out to the affected parties, etc. From a quick scan, it does not appear that the former claims to have done anything themself?
denys-moveinfra 13 hours ago [-]
I guess that is something next level. I think CF or bunny will bring that or improve their CDNs. They already can cache some fonts, third party scripts. I am expecting as paid feature that secure loading scripts only from trusted sources like CF or bunny. I am betting not more then 3-6 month to wait.
AznHisoka 13 hours ago [-]
All sites detected to be using Optimizely: bloomberry.com/data/optimizely-web-experimentation/
duxup 1 days ago [-]
Let’s say I use Optimizely (I don’t), is there a good best practice to say?:
“yeah load this JS m, but it can’t load / random other JS referencing sketchy places”
Feels nice knowing several years ago I worked on forcing CSP (including removing unsafe-eval) on some customers for a site builder product, as they have to manually whitelist domains which limits the impact of these sorts of attacks...
Yeah, honestly I wish they'd move that section higher up - it's probably he most genuinely useful tidbit in the article.
As an aside - I'm rabidly against "analytics" companies that come in and suggest that the right "getting started" choice is to drop untrusted JS they own (and can update at any time) onto your site.
It's "easy", but it completely breaks your security model.
If I were a lawyer... I'd be taking a serious look at putting optimizely into the meat grinder for recommending 'unsafe-eval' as a script source... it literally has "unsafe" in the fucking name for a reason. This alone should end the company. It won't, because this space is absolutely FILLED with scummy behavior, but it should.
---
A strict CSP is one of the most meaningful ways you have right now as a web developer to reduce attack surface. People should take advantage of it.
I think the kinds of people with "security models" are not the kinds of people with third-party analytics. They're marketing to people who want it to Just Work.
horsawlarway 18 hours ago [-]
Optimizely is widely used within many large Saas companies. Including those with literal legal security requirements (soc 2, iso 27001, etc).
So are equivalent companies that recommend similar strategies. Sprig, segment, amplitude, launchdarkly, heap, full story, etc...
It's a very long list.
They all operate on the same strategy. Pitch to execs that they solve real problems and they have basically no eng cost to implement.
All you need to do is inject them into your page with absolutely no restrictions and let them run any scripts they'd like.
cowlevel 4 hours ago [-]
Compliance 101: it's not about doing what the regulation is titled, it's about satisfying the auditors and getting customer contracts.
There's no reason to use SRI any more since caches became partitioned. It won't share the cache between different websites for privacy reasons so you may as well just host the file yourself, and then there's not much reason to use SRI.
stavros 1 days ago [-]
SRI helps you make sure the script you're loading is what you initially thought, but doesn't ensure that script doesn't load other scripts, no? You need CSP for that.
technion 1 days ago [-]
Specifying scripts by hashes is always a solid defense that platforms like this don't change their script after compromise - but in practice the whole point of optimizely and similar tools it that it's expected the script will change.
Common examples like analytics tools happily change their script bundles whenever they feel like it without just tagging a new version and letting you upgrade.
I wish SRI could be used more,
skeeter2020 1 days ago [-]
I remember a team at my old place bringing down the entire app with insufficient defense around an Optimizely script that failed. Seems bonkers to take on these dependencies and I think it's only going to get worse.
computerfriend 1 days ago [-]
It's a feature. Changes to prod should always be reviewed and this fundamental incompatibility with insecurely hosted JavaScript is a signal that it is a bad idea.
mook 1 days ago [-]
Unfortunately, in this case the insecurely hosted JavaScript is the feature; that is, people who are not responsible for sites going down or breaches want to be able to add things nilly-willy (which therefore necessitates a way to bypass review).
skeeter2020 1 days ago [-]
this will prevent an unexpected version but doesn't stop a legit but compromised include from loading nefarious resources
duxup 1 days ago [-]
Very cool thank you.
JoshTriplett 1 days ago [-]
Yes. You install a CSP that says "my site cannot load any scripts from third parties". And then any script you run, you audit thoroughly and then host on your own website, ensuring it doesn't try to load anything third-party.
Never load third-party JavaScript on your site. Zero exceptions.
r1ch 1 days ago [-]
In theory yes, in practice no since every SaaS wants to ship 5 times a day and add 15 new dependencies on other SaaS providers each release, and marketing wants to load gobs of 3rd party tracking and analytics code from their favorite SaaS of the day without having to get approval from those pesky security people. Let's not even mention ad networks.
ronfriedhaber 22 hours ago [-]
> "and on iPhones and iPads it [the malware] delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits."
Isn't this anomalous? using RCE root chains in mass-delivered malware? Seems like a new precedent.
Google Ads not only delivered similar malware earlier, but Google even partnered with the hacker after a cybersecurity vendor of their choosing certified them to ace every screening criterium.
Citizen Lab’s website lets you browse trough all the malware they’ve found, so search and ye shall find lol.
trashb 20 hours ago [-]
To be honest I'm surprised that only $7040 was stolen in 9 hours. That seems like a low amount for the amount of traffic the affected sites get in those 9 hours.
bstsb 16 hours ago [-]
it would need a pretty unlikely combination; a user would have to visit (say) bbc.com after copying a crypto address, and before they paste it into something else to send funds
justinhj 15 hours ago [-]
That would be low hanging fruit. You can bet they saved all this data and can spend the next months mining it to see which passwords fit on which sites and so on.
paaloeye 11 hours ago [-]
> This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect. Our platform can identify unexpected changes to trusted JavaScript…
Unapologetically AI/LLM. I reckon that’s where I and 80% of readers stop being readers.
tempfile 21 hours ago [-]
> This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect.
So is this article just an ad? It makes it hard to tell what's true and what's exaggerated.
karmajunkie 1 days ago [-]
what are the practical effects of this? Does this mean that a customer of Zoom was downloading malware all day?
skullone 16 hours ago [-]
I hated using optimizely. Built for the dumbest devs, integrates at the core, optimizely has already burned bridges with their pricing and support, and now this. Sadly, their ignorant users get to suffer consequences of their ignorant SaaS provider
jgalt212 18 hours ago [-]
Doesn't GTM detect malware, or was this malware only being served to non Google IP addresses? Even so, I'm sure Google has access to millions of residential IP addresses to run security scans.
kwhatever 20 hours ago [-]
I mean, yes to all the things, CSP, malware checker, CDN etc.
A good reminder to never allow optimizely's shit to run. Here is to uBlock origin and noscript/uMatrix saving the day. Like probably every day the last 15 years or so.
usr1106 1 days ago [-]
I visited at least 2 of the listed sites. I don't own any crypto, so no problem there. I might have entered my credit card details to some site, definitely not to the 2 listed ones. But with the whole "load 300 scripts" cancer in "modern" web you never know.
I guess all I can do now is emptying my browser cache to be on the safe side. The writeup (piece of marketing for their product) has no section for affected end users
Yes, I sometimes used NoScript and uBlock Matrix, but gave up on those because it's a tedious job to manage your allow lists.
karlkloss 1 days ago [-]
I still think that running scripts in a browser is a bad idea, but what do I know.
cowlevel 18 hours ago [-]
I don't know what you know, but I know something you don't know: how to maximize revenue.
Exoristos 1 days ago [-]
Perhaps at last these unserious names will be abandoned as newsworthy failures become more common in the industry. Viz., gravitas may start to have obvious market value again.
meindnoch 23 hours ago [-]
Compromised? They ate grilled cheese off the radiator or what?
fnoef 21 hours ago [-]
"software is solved" :brainlet:
nodesocket 13 hours ago [-]
Where is the phone home endpoint 1688360.cc hosted? Registar?Doesn’t seem to be any DNS records on that domain (probably updated).
canadiantim 15 hours ago [-]
The dangers of Javascript
jgalt212 15 hours ago [-]
14:23 UTC, still no mention of this on their home page.
Optimizely is such crap... like, all it does is A/B test different landing pages/etc for "conversions." We don't need this.
userbinator 1 days ago [-]
This has been in my HOSTS file for a while:
0.0.0.0 cdn.optimizely.com
...and now I have another reason to keep it there.
theseamusjames 1 days ago [-]
Every time one of these new attacks drops, you know there's a couple devs at OpenAI that look at each other and go, "This definitely wasn't us, right? ...right?" And how confident are they that out of Outlook, FAA, banks, and now Optimizely skimmer that none of them were either 1) agents up to some fuckery or 2) someone using their system to get up to some fuckery? It can't be 100% confident, right? ...right?
swozey 1 days ago [-]
Aren't these all mathematicians who have never had to toil in the operations trenches fixing this stuff, thats why they make 4x my salary right
Can't wait until they start killing hardware
lvbyte 17 hours ago [-]
I'm confused. What exactly would be the point of the iOS exploits? Wouldn't the device just become jailbroken?
Doohickey-d 17 hours ago [-]
Well, yes. And that means that the exploit can drop some bit of persistent malware, that will collect things like crypto wallets and passwords, throughout the OS, and not just one website.
breakwaterlabs 1 days ago [-]
> The malware was a multi-purpose kit.
Somehow this sentence immediately flags this article as AI slop.
voidhorse 1 days ago [-]
It's one of those sentences that seems like it's meaningful on first glance but that in reality conveys no information. For whatever reason LLMs are experts at cranking these sentences out.
These are not static scripts. Their content changes frequently. The customer is using them to inject dynamic content into their own sites. What you are describing would not work for this use case.
jcarrano 21 hours ago [-]
Loading dynamically changing code from a third party server is a recipe for disaster, which is exactly what was cooked here.
The code should be static and the configuration (data-only) the only thing that changes frequently, but that is less flexible and harder to implement.
cowlevel 18 hours ago [-]
It's also what they want. They want to change the code frequently, that's the whole point of outsourcing it. Telling people "just don't do the thing you want to do" is not an effective recipe for change.
Phemist 18 hours ago [-]
Next up the list I'm sure: Sentry.
esseph 1 days ago [-]
Reading this thread has made me realize that intelligence alone is no garlic, cross, or silver bullet against the bored and conspiracy minded.
sershe 1 days ago [-]
Optimizely is ~~infected with~~ malware FTFY!
stogot 1 days ago [-]
Is it just me or is there an increase of these events or increase of these posts?
joegibbs 1 days ago [-]
Yes, AI is making it much easier to hack - you can just spin up a bunch of instances to look for vulnerabilities, you don't even need to do much manual work
nullbio 1 days ago [-]
Some of it's real, the rest is a psy-op. It's not hard to figure out what the goal is.
mewpmewp2 23 hours ago [-]
Sorry, what is the goal?
0xbadcafebee 1 days ago [-]
Honestly this is getting hilarious. All the shitty decisions everyone made are now coming back to haunt them. It's "I told you so" on a worldwide cyber level.
jcarrano 21 hours ago [-]
Before the AI era you could come with a technical/security objection which was correct in theory, but everyone knew the chances of it being exploited were minuscule. In most cases what was to be gained outweighed the costs (this hack collected a mere $7k). Today, saying "this is technically wrong" likely means "it will be used against us".
operatorkit_hq 24 hours ago [-]
[flagged]
spencerawlson 17 hours ago [-]
[flagged]
jeffnappi 20 hours ago [-]
[dead]
shishir7days 23 hours ago [-]
[flagged]
jawns 1 days ago [-]
tl;dr: Someone gained write access to the script Optimizely serves on its customers' websites, and they injected malware.
What is interesting is that the write access wasn't just for a single customer, but hundreds. So either tenancy isn't strong enough, or the level of access involved in the compromise was pretty severe.
trungto 22 hours ago [-]
the base JS snippet is often the same for all tenants. The script behaviour changes depending the parameters the tenant set on their websites. All the hackers need to do is to gain access to the CDN service where the base snippet is serve, add their payload in the base snippet and it will affect all tenants.
In the age of AI if you use third party libraries you deserve all hell unleashed on you
First thing I add to my agents.md is do not use third party libraries, frameworks, fonts, icons, etc unless strictly necessary, ask first
gib444 23 hours ago [-]
You often don't even need to instruct it to not use 3rd part libraries because in my experience it defaults to creating its own hot mess, furthering your dependence on it
zenincognito 1 days ago [-]
Just stop using JS... If you control the server why not have the vendor have a server level integtration that way you are not serving any remote scripts. It would be interesting to do a study on how many of these compromise emnate from third party scripts and I am willing to bet it is over 90%
br0ceph 1 days ago [-]
stop using scripts fullstop
the web was never intended to send program code
any program code should run on the webserver
browsers should be minimalist and only support html
I hope folks are re-evaluating that now.
Even one of these accounts being compromised would be a massive security incident that would potentially put millions of people's data at risk.
In my experience the vulnerabilities are coming from tools brought in by less technical teams, which then get misused by engineers.
These tools are oddly "safe" in the hands of Marketing and the like, because nobody trusts Marketing, so they stick a bunch of guardrails in place to stop anything stupid from doing serious damage.
The same tools are dangerous in the hands of engineers - many engineers trust themselves to do risky things, and will bludgeon you with debate if you tell them they have to follow the same rules as those _simpletons_ in Marketing.
They're usually client-side because engineers don't want to waste time implementing things for Marketing (or more accurately, struggle to support a domain that is radically multidisciplinary and just-in-time and revolves around conforming to non-engineering industry norms, to such a degree that everyone prefers siloing themselves), and the safe space given to Marketing is usually a client-side tag manager so that's where they do it when they have to do it themselves, and then once the tool is implemented client-side, engineers piggybacking off it aren't going to bother with doing a new server-side implementation.
Cue engineers loading Optimizely in their secure product areas, getting exceptions added to CSPs, and the like. Then a major incident. Then a post-mortem highlighting the risks of letting Marketing manage SaaS, then a project to make a secure in-house experimentation solution which the engineers will abandon shortly afterwards... and then finally, a couple years later, someone will discover Marketing has procured Optimizely 2.0 and the cycle repeats.
Oh how I hate that one. I wish Facebook, Instagram, Google and others would figure out serving the public scripts from .com only.
Then you've done your job and move on. Just make sure that there's enough public record of your warning that - when the next cdn supply chain attack happens - you can say "I warned you about this and you decided not to take action".
No organization is perfect. I don't think this is something to quit over. Just make sure to CYA.
Life's too short to work for people who don't care about others.
Life’s too short to care about random strangers on the internet sometimes.
and things continue being insecure
NPM isn't perfect but there's typically a substantial delay between the release of a malicious package and that code getting onto your production environment. Unless you're automatically updating every day, there's a good chance someone will discover the problem before it affects you. And you can always scan your upstream dependencies.
This doesn't work if you're using someone else's CDN. Any change to their content is distributed to all your users immediately.
A javascript file served from example-a.com should be able to run on example-b.org only if it has been signed with the same TLS key used for example-a.com .
https://developers.google.com/tag-platform/security/guides/c...
In the end this is a tradeoff between security and convenience.
Not going to happen. Most decisions in tech do not factor in risk, only cost. Risk mitigation usually requires considerable spend, and very few people/companies are willing to spend on low-probability events.
We get sanctimonious about this, but geeks build all that monetization infrastructure, not people from marketing.
That’s why it needs to become criminal for a website to serve malware, including through third party channels like ad networks and analytics services. Serving shit websites is no different than knowingly, or negligently, dumping toxic waste and should be treated the same.
If your website is making any requests outside of the original domain, there's no "accidental" in anything the website does.
I see no way to distinguish between huge megacorps and individuals.
There should be standards that people have to live up to if they are going to provide a product, even for free, to others.
Open source is already expensive from a time standpoint, you wanna make it expensive from a monetary standpoint too?
We should also enforce antitrust laws.
I never really understood this idiom, because how can a PHB engineering manager (for example) be required to not understand their team's technology in order to retain their job? Surely if that manager knows their team's work inside out then they would be a more effective manager - which is good for everyone?
If I squint-my-brain, I can see how (for example) that anyone who works full-time as an SEO "consultant" in the year 2026 would only be if they actually believed that SEO tricks actually worked, which requires them to not understand how modern search-engines' spiders actually work (because it's my belief that "SEO" has been either nonsense bollocks - or a complete grift - since the mid-2010s). Am I close?
In this case, it's the dangers of the tracking and advertising frameworks being used for hostile purposes.
It's a continuous case of whack-a-mole. SEO consultants think <thing> would be a good way to improve the search ranking of their customers, it works, it spreads throughout the industry, Google catches on, rinse and repeat.
As soon as something is a KPI, there is incentive to game the system - with the top end of "gaming the system" toeing or crossing the line into fraudulent, anti-competitive or otherwise illegal territory.
--Upton Sinclair
The follow on line from that one is even better: "The most deluded people are those who choose to ignore what they already know". I would probably want to add on things like "because it's not convenient" or similar for particular relevance to some of the stuff I've been dealing with recently at work. Folks know it's dangerous to do something a certain way, and know how to do it a safe way, but it's not as convenient so they delude themselves it'll be fine just this once. And just this once too. And just this once, once more. Slowly but surely normalising the deviance.
In the context of the Optimizely case, people know they're giving it dangerous levels of capabilities, but it's just too darn inconvenient to do it in a safe way so sure, why not. It'll be fine (and it will be, right up until it isn't and you realise your choice has compromised your users)
I know we really like mass incarceration in America. But maybe start with civil liability and a private right to enforcement?
I'm programming for over 30 years now and GTM is my personal #1 most hated software.
They knew they could do it, and how, they just didn't want to spend 10 minutes doing it themselves. To them, asking an engineer to do it in code is easier because it only takes a minute to ask.
AI-assisted hacks and outages are accelerating the process of making the costs of weak security apparent.
Unless we get rid of product managers, which isn’t a terrible idea.
We got 10MB of javascript (maybe 10 years ago...) because engineering needs to build one frontend with multi browser and multi screen support so they picked an off-the-shelf do-everything framework like Amber or Angular, or a react/redux build with 300 nested dependencies.
The most infuriating thing, when you do remove these tags, marketing forgets they exist and are like "Oh we don't use that anymore".
Often also true for software development, unfortunately.
I can imagine the big corporations spending millions on econometrics teams or commissioning mix modelling like the olden days, but it's pretty shit by comparison, and beyond the MNCs there's hundreds of thousands of SMEs without the money/scale and with business models that hinge on digital advertising.
In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
It doesn't cost them anything but a "whoops" post when they fuck up, so the incentive is misaligned (as you noted under repercussions).
The cost is externalised onto everyone else not them so it's not going to change.
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CRWD/
A company making say bricks has an incentive to cut costs too certainly but they’re not implementing loot boxes, tracking people semi covertly, implementing dark patterns to boost engagement by any means or heaven forbid launching missies based on sketchy AI decisions.
The incentives are fucked across the board. When you look at the CEOs we revere and the ones who have the most leverage and mobility, it’s shocking to see how many absolutely destroyed their company in exchange for a good few quarters. That’s actually seen as good somehow, those decision makers are desirable!
When Europe tries they are either laughed at or accused of slowing down innovation.
This is the bare minimum. Automatic 3rd party requests should be considered data unsolicited data disclosure under GDPR.
Who cares? Next week you forget about this and move on
From what I could tell, the malware just generally looked at anything on the page, in cookies/local storage, or clipboard that looks like a crypto address or credit card number. So for sites like CNN or BBC they shouldn't be able to do much damage unless there is a subscription page for example that takes credit card number.
However, the malware also delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, which do take advantage of browser vulnerabilities in iOS to cause more serious damage.
The model is broken on fundamental level and it will never be fixed.
And would uBlock origin have prevented it?
For anyone unaware, this also works on Firefox on Android, as it has support for almost all extensions.
Some ublock lists (e.g. Peter Lowe's server list) block everything from optimizely.com, so if you enabled those you're good.
It's not all or nothing. NoScript [0] lets you run JS (and other specific types of content) from domains and/or sub-domains you allow and reject from those you don't. So you'd allow JS from my-serious-business domain and their CDN, and disallow all else, including those mentioned in the linked article.
[0] https://noscript.net/
It would not have helped here. gitlab.com and my bank are on the list. Obviously I could not have blocked them.
Per the linked article, those are not the domains where the malicious JS was served from.
in some cases they were
To be more specific
NoScript would have still caught if such proxy was through
* a separate custom domain that was not previously trusted by the user
* a separate sub-domain of a trusted peer domain (like the opt.scheels.com example) and NoScript user opted for sub-domain level blocking
NoScript would not have caught if the proxy was through the first party primary domain (like the www.vodafone.com.au/js example) - i.e. the domain or sub-domain that the user had already trusted.
So, while it's not a full guarantee, it reduces the exposure risk significantly in most common scenarios.
“A full inline copy of the payload, which runs through eval if 1688360.cc is blocked.”
No, the article doesn't state that the JS served by all listed first party websites was compromised (but see note below). The original maliciously modified content was still (in most cases) served from an optimizely domain like cdn.optimizely.com. The cdn.optimizely.com would not have been blocked by web browsers. The "full inline copy of the payload" refers to content served through that optimizely payload, instead of those additional domains the attacker had set up. About a paragraph or so above your quote:
> The file was still served from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate, from a host that every affected site already trusted.
That said, while this is a very common scenario, it doesn't cover all of them. There's still a possibility that certain optimizely customers have set up a reverse proxy for the optimizely JS snippet. If this proxy was through a separate sub-domain it's possible NoScript would have caught it (if user opted for sub-domain level blocking). If this proxy was through one of their own primary domain names that user already trusted in Noscript, it would not catch it. So it's not perfect, but covers most common scenarios.
Taking a step back, I'm not sure why there is so much pushback in this thread. Most of it seems to be based on either no or incorrect reading of the information or incorrect understanding. I'm not in any way associated with NoScript or trying to convince folks to use it. Given the incident, I think it's worth stating that this type of attack falls under its main use cases. A reasonably configured NoScript would have protected users in most of these cases. Whether it makes sense for users to use it or not is up to them - it depends on where you see the line between security and convenience tradeoff.
I don't doubt that. But how many users can achieve a reasonably configured NoScript, without breaking things they want to use? I am a developer, so I should be able to do it or I were a bad one. But I am sick of an immoral industry that requires me to do extra work because they are trying to steal something from me in an ever growing multitude of ways every time I click somewhere and even without.
Was a pain though on eCommerce sites as they'd often switch payment processors and then you had to do the whole dance of partially successful payments until you found the right set of allow lists.
Allows for really easy, selective and contextual permissions for some critical capabilities.
Apparently, one of Optimizely's core features is its WYSIWYG editor. This means it's supposedly useful for running A/B tests without writing any code.
However, I don't know what kind of code is generated by WYSIWYG, and I don't have a good impression of it.
It’s the same reason financial analysts build the tower of bable in Excel. Some COULD access engineering resources, but they don’t want to. The fact that there’s no controls, audibility, or quality management is not a “bug”, that’s the primary feature they’re after.
This also describes the risk of giving non-engineers access to runtimes and AI. They can, and will, build monstrosities outside of the purview of management.
Anyone knows what this might be? Can you jailbreak from safari on those versions?
[edit] From the other link, it seems to be Coruna and DarkSword exploits
The official advise is to keep a check on your account history some time before November … lol.
I think it's not used because they are continuously updating their scripts for users.
An SDK doesn't necessarily mean that scripts are kept up to date as a site's build could've been done months or years ago with the SDK version pinned in npm.
If I were to setup a system today, I would mirror any script from a third-party and pipe it through a LLM to check for malicious code before deploying.
Interesting that it is not necessarily a supply chain attack a la LiteLLM/some of the other recent breaches. Possibly just a mass compromise of customer passwords.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
Search for BBC Search for CNN
Both were part of the research and were audited as recently as October 2026 with evidence recorded that they werre deploying Optimizely without consent (a legal obligation in the EU).
So smoking gun evidence that they were unlawfully deploying Optimizely in the last 6 weeks across the EU leaves them ripe for litigation.
> Your origin can be clean while your visitors are robbed — the compromise sits in the tag layer.
The models are using language correctly, but their whole universe is limited to a single session. They're not aware that all the previous sessions also used the same phrase, that you've seen it 10 times in the last hour, etc.
Humans naturally avoid repeating the exact same phrases and jokes they just heard from several other sources, but sometimes you can see the same phenomenon with people too: when there's new bullshit phrase or trend spreading through tiktok/instagram (or popular press), there's a brief moment you can catch many normies regurgitating the exact same phrase "independently".
The front of the meme virality wave sure does look weird.
It’s not high-quality, though — it’s SEO speak to pad blog posts without adding anything of substance. We notice it more because that stuff is so common in the training data but not the experience of anyone who doesn’t spend time on content mills.
> On mobile, Report URI says they attempted to install exploit kids.
Currently says "Partial Outage Affecting Recommendations Tracking and Reporting"
Sorry I had to say it ;-)
Optimizely, or Episerver as it was previously called, was such a pleasure to work on - but since version 13 they more or less vendor locked you into their own authentication (Opti ID / Entra AD (?)) and their Optimizely Graph for search and content look up. You can keep self-hosting but you won't get access to Opti Id or Graph if you're not on their tenant.
I guess this is the inevitable happen - everyone gets hacked at the same time when hosting on a SaaS platform.
All of that for them to mess their own security.
If it was on me, I would stop using them.
https://www.newsweek.com/cyber-attack-websites-affected-1272...
whereas the one that we are commenting on now looks like an ad: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w...
It opens with:
> This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect. Our platform can ...
It's otherwise nearly the same information.
It would be kind of ironic if the hijacking warning article got hijacked, I guess?
2. The former seems super more clear to me to be AI generated prose.
3. The latter explicitly continue talks about the actions they took, that they reached out to the affected parties, etc. From a quick scan, it does not appear that the former claims to have done anything themself?
“yeah load this JS m, but it can’t load / random other JS referencing sketchy places”
Feels nice knowing several years ago I worked on forcing CSP (including removing unsafe-eval) on some customers for a site builder product, as they have to manually whitelist domains which limits the impact of these sorts of attacks...
This writeup https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w... has a section on how CSP helped (or didn't) in this attack.
As an aside - I'm rabidly against "analytics" companies that come in and suggest that the right "getting started" choice is to drop untrusted JS they own (and can update at any time) onto your site.
It's "easy", but it completely breaks your security model.
If I were a lawyer... I'd be taking a serious look at putting optimizely into the meat grinder for recommending 'unsafe-eval' as a script source... it literally has "unsafe" in the fucking name for a reason. This alone should end the company. It won't, because this space is absolutely FILLED with scummy behavior, but it should.
---
A strict CSP is one of the most meaningful ways you have right now as a web developer to reduce attack surface. People should take advantage of it.
There's a reason browser vendors now force basically all extensions into a strict CSP by default... https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manif... They won't even let you manually relax it anymore.
So are equivalent companies that recommend similar strategies. Sprig, segment, amplitude, launchdarkly, heap, full story, etc...
It's a very long list.
They all operate on the same strategy. Pitch to execs that they solve real problems and they have basically no eng cost to implement.
All you need to do is inject them into your page with absolutely no restrictions and let them run any scripts they'd like.
Common examples like analytics tools happily change their script bundles whenever they feel like it without just tagging a new version and letting you upgrade.
I wish SRI could be used more,
Never load third-party JavaScript on your site. Zero exceptions.
Isn't this anomalous? using RCE root chains in mass-delivered malware? Seems like a new precedent.
Citizen Lab’s website lets you browse trough all the malware they’ve found, so search and ye shall find lol.
Unapologetically AI/LLM. I reckon that’s where I and 80% of readers stop being readers.
So is this article just an ad? It makes it hard to tell what's true and what's exaggerated.
But how do you know that you personally didn't get affected? Check here: https://karlnorling.github.io/optimizely-hack-checker/
I guess all I can do now is emptying my browser cache to be on the safe side. The writeup (piece of marketing for their product) has no section for affected end users
Yes, I sometimes used NoScript and uBlock Matrix, but gave up on those because it's a tedious job to manage your allow lists.
https://www.optimizely.com/
Can't wait until they start killing hardware
Somehow this sentence immediately flags this article as AI slop.
The code should be static and the configuration (data-only) the only thing that changes frequently, but that is less flexible and harder to implement.
What is interesting is that the write access wasn't just for a single customer, but hundreds. So either tenancy isn't strong enough, or the level of access involved in the compromise was pretty severe.
https://x.com/tehlike/status/1432082161125888003 https://x.com/tehlike/status/1467033965215109122
Only followers this account has approved can see its posts.
https://xxcancel.com/tehlike/status/1432082161125888003
https://xxcancel.com/tehlike/status/1467033965215109122
First thing I add to my agents.md is do not use third party libraries, frameworks, fonts, icons, etc unless strictly necessary, ask first
any program code should run on the webserver
browsers should be minimalist and only support html